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Risk assessment in aviation 
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In aviation, many actions are taken to reduce risk.  However, not all risks can be avoided.  
To effectively manage risk, managers and regulators must evaluate and compare risks 
associated with different threats.  Yet, it is frequently difficult to obtain reasonable 
assessments of these risks.  Traditional approaches often produce unsatisfactory results 
when the probability of failure is low but the costs of failure are high -- as is often the 
case in modern civil aviation.  Attempts to use a single dimension to evaluate threats 
often lead to unreliable and contentious assessments.  Many risk assessment heuristics 
and displays can yield misleading and sometimes mathematically incongruous 
assessments.  Furthermore, increases in costs caused by people’s reactions to failures are 
often ignored or grossly underestimated.   In this paper, problems with risk assessment in 
aviation are discussed and a Tool for Risk Identification, Assessment, and Display 
(TRIAD) designed to address many of these problems is described. 
 
In aviation, safety and efficiency are primary goals.  Many of the actions taken by aviation professionals 
are taken to reduce risk.  However, one cannot avoid all risk.  Regulators and managers must frequently 
decide which potential problems to address.  To effectively manage risk, one must be able to evaluate the 
risks associated with different threats and compare them.  But it is frequently difficult to obtain precise 
assessments.  To accurately assess the risk associated with a potential failure or other threat, one must 
consider the possible outcomes that could occur, the likelihood of each outcome, and the consequences 
that may be associated with each outcome.  In this paper, we discuss the assessment of each of these 
aspects of risk and describe a Tool for Risk Identification, Assessment, and Display (TRIAD) that was 
designed to assist in their assessment. 
 
Risk is generally defined as a combination of likelihood and consequences -- the more damage that may 
occur, the greater the risk; the more likely a threat, the greater the risk.  In traditional probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA), risk is quantified by multiplying an estimate of the amount of potential damage by the 
estimated probability of the threat (e.g., Bier & Cox, 2007).  In many cases, this assessment can be 
accomplished simply and the obtained result matches our intuitions.  For example, a computer 
manufacturer may be able to estimate the probability that a microchip will fail within a warranty period 
quite precisely based on laboratory and field data.  Calculating the cost of a new chip and the labor 
required to replace it is also relatively straightforward.  Hence, the risk posed to the manufacturer by the 
potential failure of the microchip can be easily assessed.  However, in many cases assessing risk is much 
more difficult. 
 
Assessing the risk associated with a possible failure or other event becomes more difficult when: 
• The event of interest (e.g., a failure) can have many possible outcomes. 
• The event under consideration is not repeatable or there is no data from which to directly estimate 
the probability of the event. 
• The event could lead to different types of damage which cannot be easily measured on a common 
scale. 
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• The cost of the potential damage or the likelihood of the event is extreme. This is particularly 
noticeable when dealing with extremely unlikely events that could have catastrophic 
consequences. 
 
Aviation typically operates under these conditions.  For example, an airline may be concerned with a rash 
of pilot reports of anomalies in the operation of their new flight management systems (FMS).  Given the 
financial and personnel demands of daily operations, management must decide how much time and 
money to invest in determining the cause(s) of these reports and finding a solution.   This requires an 
assessment of the risk posed by the reported anomalies.  In the worst case, an FMS problem could lead to 
a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) accident.  But there are many other possible outcomes.  A CFIT 
accident is not likely unless the anomaly occurs on approach or shortly after departure.  However, 
encountering an anomaly en route is not without cost.  Most of the time, the pilots may notice the 
anomaly and correct it, but if they don’t -- fuel will be wasted, the pilots and airline may be the target of 
FAA enforcement actions, and there is a (very low) risk of a midair collision.  Furthermore, the anomaly 





To accurately assess the risk posed by a potential problem, one must first consider the possible outcomes 
that could result if the problem were to occur.  Often, individuals attempt to simplify this task by 
considering only the worst case.  This can be misleading.  For example, consider a hypothetical error in 
an airline’s weight and balance calculation program.  In the worst case, the aircraft could depart out of 
balance and encounter an event that causes the aircraft to enter a stall from which recovery is impossible 
given the weight distribution.  However, this is an exceedingly unlikely scenario.  A manager might 
reasonably conclude that this possibility is so remote, that other problems have a higher priority.  
However, there is a much more likely outcome that should catch the manager’s attention.  Aircraft that 
are flown “out of CG” may burn substantially more fuel because of the out-of-balance condition.  
Although this outcome is not catastrophic, over a large number of flights the cost of the error could be 
large enough to cause substantial financial damage to the airline. It is also not sufficient to consider only 
the most likely outcome.  In many cases, unlikely outcomes have sufficiently serious consequences and 
are likely enough to be cause for concern.   
 
Generating lists of possible outcomes requires domain knowledge and creativity.  However, in many 
cases, one can generate outcomes by systematically considering the general classes of factors that are 
likely to affect the result of a failure or other problem.  These factors include: 
  
Phase of flight – The point during an operation at which a problem occurs can have substantial effects 
on the possible outcomes.  For example, the failure of a critical component of a navigation system 
may have different consequences during takeoff/climb-out, en route, or during descent/landing. 
 
Time – When a problem occurs can have substantial effects on the possible outcomes.  For example, 
the failure of a component may have different consequences during the day, or during the night.  
Likewise, the same failure could have very different consequences for winter operations than for 
summer. 
 
Geography – Where a problem occurs can affect the possible outcomes.  For example, the failure of a 
critical component of a navigation system may have different consequences depending on whether the 
failure occurs over land or during a trans-oceanic flight.  
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Damage – The physical characteristics of the damage caused by a problem may affect the outcome.  
The result of a problem may be different if the physical characteristics of the damage (e.g., size, 
depth, location, and frequency) differ.  For example, the damage caused by debris from a turbine 
engine failure may be different depending on the size and depth of the penetration. 
 
Design Characteristics –The way in which a system is designed will affect the possible outcomes that 
could result from a problem.  For example, the result of the failure of a given system may differ 
depending on whether the aircraft is equipped with a backup system. Likewise, consequences of a 
failure could be very different depending on whether the failure is annunciated to the crew or not. 
 
Procedures and training – A problem can have very different outcomes depending on whether or not 
procedures exist for dealing with it, and on whether or not crews are trained to deal with it.  (Note 
also that procedures and training are often used as interventions to reduce risk.)   
 
Environmental Conditions – Environmental conditions, such as temperature, humidity, wind speed 
and direction, etc. can affect the result of a problem.  For example, the effect of a failure in a cooling 
system may depend on whether the device is at or below a critical temperature when the system fails. 
Similarly, a failure in an ice detection system would have very different consequences if the flight is 




To proceed with a risk assessment, one must estimate how likely it is that each possible outcome will 
occur.  Sometimes, the probability of a given outcome can be estimated quite precisely.  For example, one 
may have engineering data that indicate how often a component fails in practice.  But often this is not the 
case.  Many likelihood assessments must be based on expert judgments.  In many cases, experts will be 
reluctant or unable to specify a precise probability for a possible outcome.  For example, an engineer may 
be able to specify the conditions under which a component of a navigation system will fail but no one 
may know how often those conditions occur in practice. However, even in these instances, it is rarely the 
case that one knows nothing.  It is rarely the case that the probability of an outcome could plausibly range 
from zero to one.  Even when one cannot estimate the probability associated with an outcome precisely, 
one can often offer a “best estimate” and specify a range around that estimate that will confidently bracket 




Because risk is a function of likelihood and consequence, the possible damage that could result from an 
event must be assessed. In the microchip example used above, it was relatively easy to assess the possible 
damage because the costs are easy to calculate and only one type of damage, monetary loss, was 
considered.  However, an event could cause many different types of damage that are not easily measured 
on a single scale.  An event could cause property damage, injury or loss of life, or disrupt operations.  
Furthermore, an event could generate secondary damage through people’s reactions to the original event. 
  
People often attempt to simplify the assessment process by trying to use one measure to scale all of the 
different types of damage.  For example, insurance companies and international agreements specify how 
much the loss of a limb or the death of an airline passenger is worth in dollars. These amounts can then be 
combined together with estimates of the costs of property damage and lost revenues to arrive at a single 
monetary value that can be used as the measure of the consequences of an accident.  However, attempting 
to create a single scale on which all potential consequences can be arrayed may be counter-productive.  
For example, people may reasonably disagree with the value attached to life by an insurance company; 
courts often do. Furthermore, these calculation may lead decision-makers to make trade-offs that they 
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themselves find unacceptable.  For example, if an arbitrary monetary value is attached to the value of a 
life, then the rational decision is to forgo safety investments whenever the costs of those investments 
exceeds the monetary value of the lives likely to be lost if the investment is not made.  Once a monetary 
value for a life is accepted, the trade-off appears rational although the individuals making the decision 
may not agree that the value of a life can be reduced to the specified amount. 
 
Disagreements about the validity of an assessment may arise not because of any debate over the possible 
consequences or their likelihood but only over the value attached to the consequences.  To avoid these 
distractions, it is often better to evaluate the consequences of an event on separate dimensions that are 
combined only when general agreement on the combination rules can be established.  These dimensions 
may differ by domain.  By default, TRIAD provides for the assessment of four types of threats: threats to 
life and health, threats to property, threats to mission (operational) success, and social amplification. 
 
Social amplification refers to the secondary damage caused by people’s reactions to an event (Kasperson 
et al, 1988).  This consequence is often underappreciated.   For example, the damage caused by a fatal 
crash of an airliner includes the value of the aircraft, the damage to life, limb, and property in the aircraft 
and on the ground, and the loss of revenue caused by the loss of the aircraft and the disruption to the 
schedule.  However, the damage caused by a fatal crash of an airliner also includes the psychological 
trauma endured by survivors and relatives, increases in fears of flying, and damage to the reputation of 
the airline and the industry.  Some of the costs of this damage are borne by the airline or its insurers either 
directly in payments to individuals or indirectly in lost ticket sales and decreased stock values.  Some of 
these costs are borne by the industry in decreased travel and calls for increased governmental oversight.  
Some of the costs are borne by the society as a whole.  In many cases, the costs associated with social 
amplification can substantially outweigh all other consequences.   
 
Combining consequences that are assessed on different dimensions presents another problem.  Often, the 
degree of damage will be evaluated on ordinal scales, but the values are treated as if they were interval or 
ratio scales.  This can cause problems.  For example, one is tempted to consider a reduction in a 
consequence rating from “5” to “3” as being greater than a reduction from “3” to “2” although ordinal 
scales carry no information about the relative sizes of the intervals between the markers.  Hence, an 
intervention that causes a reduction from “5” to “3” may be seen as much more valuable than one that 
only reduces the rated hazard from “3” to “2”.  However, because the intervals between categories are not 
constant, the improvement reflected by a consequence reduction from “3” to “2” may be greater on some 
absolute scale than the improvement obtained by reducing the rated consequence from “5” to “3” and this 




Figure 1.  Illustration of possible ordinal values relative to an absolute scale. 
 
This problem is exacerbated when one attempts to combine ordinal scales.  Because the same numerals 
are typically used as markers for relative positions on different scales, users are sorely tempted to treat 
markers with the same numerical representation as if they were identical and to perform inappropriate 
arithmetic operations on them.  For example, individuals often attempt to multiply the ordinal ratings 
obtained from two different scales.  Consider attempting to combine ratings of threats to life/health and 
Typically assumed marker positions:  Equal intervals between markers. 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
Possible actual marker positions: Different intervals between markers. 
 
1  2     3    4      5 
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threats to property.  If these are made on 5 point scales, the results can be displayed using a matrix like 
that in Table 1.  In general, things get worse from bottom to top, left to right, and along the diagonal from 
lower left to upper right.  However, one cannot easily combine this information into a single summary 
measure.  For example, if the ordinal ratings on each dimension are multiplied, then an outcome rated as 
Property Damage 5* Life & Health 2 would be considered as risky as an outcome rated Property Damage 
2* Life & Health 5 (2*5=5*2=10).  But this is not necessarily the case.  An incident in which multiple 
lives are lost but the property damage is $1-$10 million may not be equivalent to one in which there are 
only minor injuries but the properly damage exceeds $250 million.  Neither is it the case that an outcome 
rated as Property Damage 3* Life & Health 4 (3*4=12) is necessarily worse than one rated as Property 
Damage 2* Life & Health 5 (2*5=10). 
 
Table 1. Ordinal Scale Matrix. 
 
Property Damage  




$10 - $100 
Million 




Life & Health 1 2 3 4 5 
    Multiple Deaths 5      
    Single Death 4      
    Major Injury 3      
    Minor Injury 2      




Assessing outcomes with extreme consequences pose a particularly difficult problem (Kunreuther, 2002).  
In most cases, the traditional calculation of risk as the product of the probability of an event and the 
potential consequences appears to approximate our sense of what risk is.  For example, a business is 
likely to treat a high likelihood of a small monetary loss as of roughly equivalent risk to a low likelihood 
of a somewhat larger loss.  However, when the probabilities and/or consequences approach their 
extremes, the risk estimate produced by the traditional calculation departs from what most people feel it 
should be.  In particular, an event that could cause a catastrophe with very low probability is generally 
seen as much riskier than an event that is highly likely to cause an outcome with very low cost. 
   
This phenomenon is not entirely psychological.  Extreme consequences are different.  For example, an 
airline can plan for how to respond to most potential outcomes.  But one cannot plan for how to respond if 
the consequence is the collapse of the company.  There is a discontinuity in the risk function at the point 
at which the consequences become unbearable.  One cannot treat the collapse of the company, the 
destruction of an ecosystem, or the death of a society as simply an outcome with very high costs.  This 
does not mean that one cannot assess extreme risks, only that one should not rely on the mechanical 




The value of a risk assessment depends on its ability to inform decisions.  Hence, the manner in which the 
results are displayed is of considerable importance.  Risk assessments are often portrayed by a single 
point on a two dimensional (probability X consequence) display (see left panel, Figure 2).  This display 
neatly summarizes the assessment but it does not provide many important details.  From this display, one 
cannot determine the precision of the assessment.  For example, the “+” in Figure 2 may reflect a very 
precise value or it may indicate a best guess within a 95% confidence interval that extends from 1 to 5.  
Only one point is displayed (usually the worst case), although a single event may produce several possible 
outcomes each of which may occur with different likelihoods and cause different consequences.  All of 
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the possible types of consequences are combined on a single scale, but the manner in which they are 
combined is not clear. 
 
Figure 2. A Common Risk Matrix (left); TRIAD Life & Health likelihood X consequence display (center) 
and logarithmic risk display (right) showing a possible range of estimates. 
In many cases, better decisions may be made if the risks associated with different possible outcomes are 
displayed, different displays are used for different types of consequences, and confidence intervals around 
estimates are depicted.  TRIAD includes these enhancements (see Figure 2).  Different 5 (consequence) X 
5 (likelihood) matrices are used to display different consequence dimensions.  The evaluators’ best 
estimates of the likelihood and consequence values of each possible outcome (identified by number) are 
displayed on these graphs (in the center pane of Fig. 2). Auxiliary graphs display the plausible range of 
likelihood for each outcome (in the right pane of Fig. 2). 
Conclusion 
 
In aviation, managers and regulators continually assess risk.  However, the heuristics that are commonly 
used have inherent problems that can render the assessments invalid.  Relatively simple steps can be taken 
to substantially improve the quality of risk assessments even when quantitative data is sparse and 
traditional probabilistic risk assessment techniques cannot be applied.  TRIAD is one tool that can support 
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